tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post3161745653775024721..comments2024-03-26T14:19:33.332-07:00Comments on Bench Grass: Beau Sabreur: Alam el HalfaErik Lundhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05728486209757153685noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-595767411034740722012-09-07T13:50:04.604-07:002012-09-07T13:50:04.604-07:00I have relatives who lived there in the 1990s. Cyb...I have relatives who lived there in the 1990s. Cyberstalker.Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-2154097133447555222012-09-07T10:26:54.103-07:002012-09-07T10:26:54.103-07:00That's it. I've got to talk about the Fore...That's it. I've got to talk about the Forest of Arden.Erik Lundhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05728486209757153685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-90185919445089573012012-09-06T14:21:36.344-07:002012-09-06T14:21:36.344-07:00heigh ho, the mystery of command and the professio...heigh ho, the mystery of command and the profession of intelligence analysis.<br /><br />which may bring you back to Ernest May.Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-26701867045145842382012-09-06T13:57:42.197-07:002012-09-06T13:57:42.197-07:00The tricky part is figuring out where the enemy is...The tricky part is figuring out where the enemy is going to be.<br /><br />No, wait, scratch that. The tricky part is figuring it out, and then persuading the enemy to impale themselves on you, as opposed to going around.Erik Lundhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05728486209757153685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-73491652123741198362012-09-06T13:18:44.397-07:002012-09-06T13:18:44.397-07:00Isn't that precisely the point of mobility?Isn't that precisely the point of mobility?Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-29943492061533304512012-09-06T10:05:35.893-07:002012-09-06T10:05:35.893-07:00Ian (Malcolm Brown) has a great quote about how th...Ian (Malcolm Brown) has a great quote about how the cavalry absorbed such a disproportionate amount of the motor transport in WWI, moving all of that fodder. I was going to put it in, but decided that the post was already riding off in enough directions.<br /><br />Because we know that's what the cavalry does wrong, right? All of that mobility stuff? They should just go where the enemy is going to be, dig into impregnable positions, and then slaughter the charging enemy with firepower. <br /><br />Wow. I'll bet that would work as a book about strategy. I wonder if I could get an endorsement from some IDF generals?Erik Lundhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05728486209757153685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-64568866743406281122012-09-06T01:58:41.244-07:002012-09-06T01:58:41.244-07:00Of course, Liddell-Hart's gloss on Alam Halfa ...Of course, Liddell-Hart's gloss on Alam Halfa is that the British armour finally got to fight like the Royal Tank Regiment wanted to, and like the Germans had been, not like the cavalry - manoeuvring to commanding ground and then halting-to-fire, with the anti-tank gun line. Famously, one of the armoured brigade commanders (Gatehouse?) asked Monty who was going to be responsible for "loosing the armour" and got a flea in his ear. Nobody was going to be "loosed" anywhere and the armour would stand on the line of Alam Halfa ridge.<br /><br />And of course, being BLH, this is the final victory of all the good stuff he rolled up in the RTR black beret over the Evil of Cavalry.<br /><br />Now, Erik is no doubt going to tell us that Liddell-Hart was full of shit. But I think you can make a case that the (successful) tactics of Alam Halfa are quite close to the (successful) tactics of the British cavalry in 1914 - move, then shake out and defend with firepower - and the (failed) tactics of Gazala are more like the (failed) tactics of von der Marwitz's dashing squadrons racing towards the British flank and then, er, not. <br /><br />(ISTR Guderian sez they ran short of fodder as early as 6th August, and of course every time they met Allenby they came off worst, the Allied flank was never turned, and well, the Germans lost the war with well-known results like Barbarossa and Spike Milligan.)Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6568915967186844196.post-87442448338109449162012-09-06T01:39:48.473-07:002012-09-06T01:39:48.473-07:00Damn, that table has just made me realise that I m...Damn, that table has just made me realise that I misread a key passage in David Kenyon's thesis, leading to me massively under-representing the number cavalry in the BEF in my essay on horses and social status. But it's in a Brill volume, so no-one will notice what they can't afford.<br /><br />Kenyon also says be suspicious of Edmonds because he was prejudiced against cavalry, but the examples he gives are more about the tactical level, especially the 'last machine gun' myth.<br /><br />I'd say another problem with cavalry in the 20th century is the logistics of supporting such a huge number of horses. In the English Civil War, numbers were small enough that they could survive by buying or requisitioning dry fodder from civilians. In 1914, Cavalry Corps was an order of magnitude bigger than any ECW field army's cavalry (and ammunition consumption was probably much greater). Presumably they had to be supplied in much the same way as the infantry, which would limit their mobility. Cavalry seem to have performed best in Palestine, where more of the transport was motorized. It's a counter-intuitive paradox that the huge concentrations of horses achieved in WW1 depended on new technology.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com