Wednesday, June 22, 2011

The Plantation of the Atlantic, V: Modernity Was Paid For By Your Taxes, And It Was Incidental to Winning Dynastic Wars

I wrote all sorts of things in the course of completing my thesis that have been hanging about in various storage media ever since. This piece informs my thinking about the establishment of the modern Atlantic order, and more recently my reading of Brendan Simms. In the past it has been a Microsoft Word for Macs document, Wordperfect 7.0 (bleeah!), Open Office (bleeah more!), and Word2007 (why can't you cut and paste into the reference list window? WTF, Redmond?). The true horrors of the formatting changes seem to be confined to the footnotes, and I'm interested in seeing what happens to them when I hit "Publish," so I'm not going to muck around with them.

So the only place that this is out in the world is in a very small and off-topic part of a University of Toronto thesis, and it plays a huge role in informing my picture of how the Atlantic world got the way it did. Heck, it explains why I'm putting my foot down on my sinister readings of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, aware as I am that chances are that I'm going to get my scholarly butt handed to me. It's that "winter quarters" in the sequence of events leading to the "Danish conquest of East Anglia." That's my territory, medievalist dudes! So why not put it on the Intertube, too?

Oh, and let's set the mood. Toronto in the 1990s, defined....

Appendix 3: “The three most important factors in war are money, money, and money:” Money, Forage, and Strategy.

Field Marshal Conte Raimundo Montecuccoli[1]

  The preceding thesis has been about the practice of war, rather than its strategic direction, but the latter had its impact on the former.  In practical matters, money was the single most important issue in the conduct of operations during the Succession Wars, and a financial narrative of the War of the Spanish Succession can provide at least as coherent a narrative of its opening, main stages, and ultimate conclusion as does the conventional story of battles and sieges.  While it is beyond the scope of this appendix to tell the whole story of the financing of the war, one aspect of war expenditures, the cost of fodder, is of obvious interest in the light of the discussion in Chapter 2.  Fodder, along with rations and wages for men, and recruiting and remounting money, represented the most important part of army expenditure on war.  Fodder was also, as we shall see below, necessarily procurred locally.  The limited area from which fodder could be drawn has some important strategic or logistical implications.  It also significantly shaped the pattern of Great Power military efforts and expenditures.  Both the amounts which a given state could spend on war, and the size of its mobilised armies depended on the problem of forage supply.  For this reason, attempts to assess the economic power, and fiscal efficiency, of the various states engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession which depend too narrowly on estimates of global expenditure are too simplistic.  Furthermore, because army size depended on the availability of forage, any larger conclusions drawn on the basis of total mobilised strengths must be checked against fodder considerations.  In particular, the thesis that Quatorzan absolutism allowed the French army to steadily increase in size through the latter half of the eighteenth century, although no doubt correct in its details, must be checked against the theatres in which the French army operated.  The same caution must be applied to the less often considered, but also large armies deployed in Pannonia by the Habsburgs.  Figure III.1, below, suggests that there was actually a considerable degree of continuity in army size in the major theatres throughout this period.  For some theatres this can be demonstrated to be linked to fodder costs.  In others, the correlation is at least intuitively reasonable.

 To begin with, we should briefly discuss the relationship between financial and military balance of power during the War of the Spanish Succession, because cursory studies of the statistics can lead to conclusions not supported by logistical analysis.  The first obvious comparison is that between the British and Habsburg contributions to the war.  At its 1704 peak, the Imperial army numbered 140,000 regular soldiers.[2] This number is not precisely broken down by the authority who cites it, and it is worth noting that a contemporary publicist cited a total of 180,000 men for the forces of the “whole Empire,” a figure supported by archival sources as considered to be an achievable list strength[3] that is, as real as Louis XIV’s 250,000 men under arms.[4]  According to the best authority, the Emperor spent £57 million on war between 1688 and 1714.  In contrast, the United Netherlands mobilised an army of 110,000 men and spent  £50-70 million, while England mobilised 70,000 and spent £171 million.  These  figures perhaps underestimate the total Imperial spending, which might have exceeded £78 m, but still reflect a paradoxical result.[5]  The Austrian Habsburg dominions had a population almost equal to that of England, yet mobilised something like half the war finance, while, as we shall see, borrowing only a fraction as much. The hereditary lands were productively backwards compared with England, to be sure, but the difference is not so great as the intuition suggests. The Waldviertel and Tirol might have been wild and unproductive, but so were many parts of England, and on the other hand Bohemia stands more direct comparison with southeast England. It seems unlikely that the mobilised national income of the Austrian lands was half that England.[6]  Examining the English balance, we find that London raised £49.3 in 1689-97, 16.5 m. of that by borrowing; and £93.6 m. in 1699-1713, £29.4 m. of it by borrowing.[7]  Average annual English state income was thus 3.64 m. pounds sterling in the Nine Years War, 5.9 m. during the War of the Spanish Succession, 60% of which was raised in equal measure from customs and excise, 40% from the land and malt taxes.[8]  These figures at once demonstrate the volatility of tax revenues during the period, and the importance of imports and exports.  They also make clear the English dependence on state borrowing for up to a third of war finance.  In comparison, state borrowing contributed perhaps as much as one-ninth, as little as one-eleventh of the monies needed for the Habsburg war effort.  There is no doubt whatsoever that the City represented a more efficient capital market than Vienna in this period, but the disparity is again striking, especially considering the strikingly unfavourable comparison between the even more financially efficient United Netherlands and England.  Even at first glance there are clearly some structural factors at work here.

   England, in the first instance, was in an unusual position, because its military strength had to be exported.  With the exception of naval forces operating in home waters or on New World expeditions, these forces could not depend on domestic sources of supply.  For this reason, its strong and flexible banking industry, even apart from the Bank of England,[9] played an important role, but there are limits to the amounts of credit even the most efficient banking sector can provide.  There was a real basis for England’s ability to export its military power.  Of these, the most significant was the colonial trade, while of secondary importance was manufacturing, particularly textiles.  Although in domestic terms American and Indies products were pure luxuries, a large proportion of goods imported into England from its nascent empire were re-exported.  They thus contributed to customs and excise, and gave England a strong trade balance with a number of markets, of which northwest Germany and the Netherlands were of particular importance. This positive trade balance allowed England to buy fodder in these areas, but imposed certain constraints on English strategy.  First, if the English government wished to maintain a large army in Europe, it had to be in the Netherlands, or, at least somewhere that was willing to take a large share of English goods.  Second, although colonial trade was not a large proportion of the English economy as a whole, it played a disproportionate role in funding the war effort, and was thus a particularly vulnerable aspect of the whole English strategic posture.  Third, when the English government did wish to intervene in a theatre for purely strategic reasons, it had to press its exports onto local allies, a policy which naturally created local resentment.[10]  Fourth, in regions where England had a sufficiently large trade balance, it could also procure forage for the contingents of allied armies, which practice is susceptible to misinterpretation.  Fourth, because dependent on loans, the English war effort reached its limits not from defeat in battle, but when its loans began to be discounted.  One cannot argue that it was the superior strength of the English economy which allowed it to play a disproportionately important role in period strategy, but rather the strategic value of the particular nature of its economy[11]  Further, there is room to argue that the financial crisis which began in 1709 forced England from the war, a point which needs to be made explicit, in the light of synthetic accounts of the rise of the English empire which can inadvertently elide the events of 1712-13 into a model of deep English economic strength which is more accurate for the mid-century and later.[12] 

  Between 1689 and 1713, France spent roughly 5 billion livre , a figure which P. G. M. Dickson converts into £ 300 m., or “only slightly less than the combined expenses of France’s three chief opponents.”  Of this, 27% was borrowed.[13]  Despite both France’s colossal revenue and its equally colossal power of credit, contemporaries held to the opinion that France defied the rest of Europe on the basis of Spanish silver.  These two views are not necessarily irreconcilable.  It is certainly true that France received a considerable share of New World silver in this period.  Besides taking a large share of the private trade, on at least two occasions the French government was able to aggrandise the whole of the official treasure, thereby securing as much as £ 2.5 m. silver.[14]  This does not seem like much in comparison with the total resources available to the Quatorzan government, but since France fought its war on loans and paper money, an available reserve of hard currency played an important role in maintaining state credit by allowing the government to meet interest payments to important creditors in coin.  Despite this influx of coin, observers noted a steady fall in France’s supply of specie, not surprisingly, given the French government’s deliberate resort to inflation as a tool of finance.[15]  How was this money spent?  In the early part of the war, substantial French armies fought in Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands, and were necessarily supported by remittances of funds, especially since the largest armies operated in Spanish territory, and had to pay for their forage.  After 1706, these armies had recoiled on French territory.  Aside from a residual commitment to Spain,  French armies now operated on the defensive in a number of domestic theatres.  Of these defensive armies, the smallest was the one which covered the Piedmontese border, in large part because of the scanty and inaccessible supply of Alpine forage.  Another small army operated in Alsace to cover that province, the approaches to Franche Comté, and the traditional German invasion route into France via the Moselle[16]  Only in 1703/4, with Bavarian assistance, was this army able to take the offensive and enter the valley of the upper Danube.  Finally, throughout the war, and especially after 1706, France and Spain together had upwards of a 100,000 men concentrated in the French and Spanish-Austrian Netherlands in every campaigning season.  This force thus constituted something like half of Louis XIV’s famous 250,000 men.Ó After 1708, the army of Flanders was almost exclusively based on French soil, and thus could be paid in coin without the export of species.  It also fought a quite economical war, resisting rather than waging sieges.

   This brief strategic tour d’horizon  is explicitly based on the need for local supply of forage.  The basic reason for this is that grass and hay are difficult to move.  In Chapter 2, typical daily rations of horses on the order of 10 kg. a day were indicated.  The Grand Convoy, for instance, would have required almost 700 tonnes of hay and oats each day, the product of (roughly) 700 acres of meadow.[17]  Besides being heavy, fodder is also bulky, and is not normally moved great distances.[18]  D. W. Jones has concluded that the English merchant marine could not have shipped sufficient supplies, in particular fodder from England to the Netherlands.[19]  As a further consequence of the difficulties of transporting forage, the carrying capacity of ancien régime roads depended on the local fodder supply, as well as geologic factors such as the supply of suitable rock for crushing.  Thus, roads across relatively marshy and barren areas could not support the level of traffic needed to maintain an army.  The Alps, Ardennes, Jura, and Black Forest, for instance, constituted impassable barriers to the advance of large armies, as did the swampy low areas of the upper Rhine and the Generality Lands in the southern Dutch Republic.  In contrast, the unpopulated but green and relatively lowlands of Pannonia, cut by rivers that exposed decent quarries, did not, at least as long as the rivers were low so that the meadows were not drowned.[20]  Regions with large fodder crops could support large armies, or even larger armies at less cost, since the price of forage would be lower.  Governments of the period which operated armies within their own borders, as did France, could, of course, procure supplies at home.  This raises the other problem of local supply, which is financial.  The French intendancies were free to pay cash money, token (pewter) coinage or bills, confident that these would only circulate at home, and indeed, to a large extent, only in the region of operations.  Such expedients contributed to inflationary pressures on the whole domestic economy, and had the potential to put the province of operations under even more extreme stress, but they did not threaten that most vulnerable area of the ancien régime economy, the limited money supply (especially in Germany).[21]  In contrast, in foreign wars, once the limits of contributions (looting) on enemy territory were reached, an army had to buy its forage, and for this had to offer the currency of the country.  How did England or the Habsburg Kriegscommisariat obtain their écus de Brabant ?  To some extent this could be done by exporting bullion, but only net bullion producers or re-exporters like Spain, Portugal, and to some extent England could do this, for a net export of bullion from an economy soon had serious deflationary consequences, and in any case no eighteenth-century state, except possibly Prussia, had enough bullion in reserve to pay for a major military effort.[22]  The alternative was to procure local currency with exports, hence the importance of a positive balance of trade in the theatre of war.  The scale of positive trade balance required for a war on the scale of that of the Spanish Succession could not depend on intrinsically healthy export industries like mining.  These simply did not earn enough money.  In addition, the state could subsidise the export of staples, as the English subsidised wheat and coal exports, but this was possible only to a point.[23]  Manufactured exports played a more important role in maintaining positive trade balances, so that the industries of England, the Lillois, Silesia, and Lombardy had disproportionate military value.  Finally, of course, there was the re-export of colonial goods.

   The last are particularly important in the light of the subsidies which England, the United Netherlands, and France paid for German troops or political support at various times, which is somewhat susceptible to being misinterpreted.  Because the war effort of the German princes in this period was heavily dependent on subsidy, it appears rather mercenary in character, as later in the century it certainly became in some areas.  This is not completely fair for the 1683-1714 period.  We can take in on faith that Hesse-Cassel, for instance, wanted to fight France.  The problem was that unless the French obligingly came to Hess-Cassel, there was little that Hessian troops could do to France.  Eager as German princes were to enhance their supply of negotiable items the reality was that they could not export their national wealth to regions from which they could threaten France.  On the contrary, their balances of trade wavered on the edge of being unfavourable, in particular because of the import of colonial goods like sugar.  No wonder that sugar was the very symbol of wealth and conspicuous consumption in this period![24]  It was not that Hess-Cassel were economically weak in the sense of having a relatively low GDP in comparison to the English, but rather a question of where the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel could realise the wealth of his state.  The reality was that he could not fight the French because they were not in Hesse-Cassel, but, at the same time, the English had a large positive trade balance with his region, which allowed the English government (by buying bonds from the exporters who traded with Hesse-Cassel) to realise large sums of money within the landgraviate.  With this money the English could pay a direct subsidy to support the Hessian war effort, just as they could procure fodder and other necessities for an expeditionary corps of Hessians operating against France in the Netherlands.  Money supply and trade patterns, and the impossibility of moving forage long distances explains who subsidised whom. 

  If a prince was so fortunate that, unlike the Landgraf of Hesse-Cassel, the enemy came to him, he had a powerful and uncounted resource.  For all early modern states, a large part of state revenue, lay in labour services and payment in kind.  A large portion of the economy was not yet monetarised, and therefore could not be taxed in coin.  Armies which fought on home soil, like those of France, Spain, and the Empire, could utilise these non-monetary resources to wage war.  The evidence which suggests that large portions of the Reich bore a larger economic burden in the end-of-century wars than they did during the Thirty Years War indicates as much as anything the scale of the economic effort made by the continental powers, where comparisons of expenditure are problematic.[25]  Dickson’s comparisons of relative financial effort are thus to be treated with some reservation.  It is difficult to put a financial value on the efforts of corvée pioneers, or the fields thrown open to the sovereign’s horses in lieu of unpaid taxes, precisely because these alternatives were used in lieu of taxes in coin.[26]  The English, who made little or no use of these means and who possessed a more lucrative taxable cash flow than most in the form of the City of London’s import/export business, have probably the most fully accounted war effort.  Conversely, the continental Powers probably spent much more on the war than the fiscal statistics suggest.  A particularly interesting aspect of this general disparity is the strikingly high proportion of the “subsidy” paid by the primarily agricultural “Land provinces” of the Dutch Republic.  Where we are used to being told that the “Sea provinces” of Zealand and Holland played a predominant part in the finances of the state and navy, we can assume that in subsidising the army, the agricultural provinces played a much larger role.  As in England, the large share of state revenues provided by excise and duties obscures the value of agriculture in the Dutch economy.[27]  Although we know of this example precisely because it was monetarised, it does indicate that even as “advanced” an economy as that of the Dutch still possessed pre-modern characteristics which must be taken into account in estimating the relative financial burden of the war.

   For the Habsburgs specifically, the problems of financing the War of the Spanish Succession break down into three distinct periods.  In 1701-05, substantial armies operated in northeastern Italy, drawing supply from Tyrol and Hungary.  In 1704-09, but especially in the first years, the Hereditary Lands also supported a major military effort against the Hungarian rebels.  After the victories of 1706, the major military effort shifted to the Netherlands.  As long as operations were close to the Hereditary lands, the costs could be met from the revenues of these lands, and loans denominated in guilders were useful.  Significantly, the largest portion of Habsburg war loans were raised in this period, especially from the Hofjuden, preeminently Samuel Oppenheimer, but also the grand magnates whose emergency loans in 1704 did so much to protect the state from imminent collapse.  The costs of operations in the Rhineland, which continued throughout the war, were presumably met by Reichstag subsidy.  In 1706 and after, Italian revenues sufficed to meet the needs of Imperial troops which were operating much more deepy in Italy than in 1705 and before.  Finally, in the campaigns of 1708 and after, the larger portion of the Imperial army operated in the Netherlands, and 1701-14 Habsburg armies also operated in Germany, especially in the Rhineland, and here we can only presume that the ReichstagÕs subsidy played the predominant role along with miscellaneous exports and the revenues of Habsburg Swabian territories.  In Italy, the Habsburg state practiced “direct supply” through various means, including direct shipping from Hungary, but fodder was still presumably obtained locally, which goes far to explain the small armies operating there.  Finally, in 1708-13, there was a substantial Imperial army operating in the Low Countries.  Fodder was supplied in part by French contributions, and in part by loans raised in Amsterdam on the Hereditary Land’s export trades in Istrian quicksilver, and Silesian textile exports, and the anticipated revenues of the recovered Obedient Netherlands.[28]  Here then, is at least one reason for the relatively small Habsburg resort to borrowing to support its war effort.  Guilden denominated loans could not support a war where the Guilden could not be spent.  Only Dutch or Italian based borrowing could support the “foreign” war effort, and this was done to the extent that revenues in the relevant currencies could be used to service the loans. 

   What of the continuities over time shown by the size of armies operating in certain theatres?  Chandler has noted a basic axiom, that European warfare could only be conducted in regions with a sufficiently high local population to provide the agricultural surplus needed to support war.  He cites the Netherlands, the Po valley, and to a lesser extent the upper Rhine as such areas.[29]  Yet the pattern of army sizes from theatre to theatre is much more peculiar than this scheme suggests.  The rich Po valley, the most important portion of the disputed Spanish succession, consistently saw much smaller armies operating there than in the Netherlands.  In 1747 various strategists took it for granted that in a general war involving foreign expeditionary forces and all of northwest Italy, the total number of men in theatre would be under 100,000,[30] and there is little reason to doubt this.  Yet Pannonia, remote, and uncivilised, supported contending armies of allegedly more than half a million men, and the Imperial army alone often reached totals of 80,000 men, while the upper Rhine supported armies not much larger than Italy.  Meanwhile, the Low Countries supported as many as 300,000 men in arms at any one time.  The Pannonian case, as mentioned, is clearly linked to the availability of forage.  In the Low Countries, fodder was also grown in great quantities, especially in the artificial meadows.  Here the limit was financial.  Neither the Dutch nor the French, who possessed territories in these regions needed to worry about money supply.  The English, who did, had a substantial export trade to the region.[31]  The emperor, especially after he became sovereign of the Austrian Netherlands, might have seemed the best of the powers which customarily operated armies in modern Belgium, but in practice the emperor was restricted to a small portion of the revenues of the Austrian Netherlands, and had to secure war finance through other means.  In Italy, it would appear that the problem was financial, and if high fodder costs were a part of the problem, we could better understand the consistently abysmally poor condition of all the cavalries which fought there in this period.[32]  

 Figure III.1:  Table of Typical Army Strengths at Various Battles, by Theatre,                                                                                               1683-1740.

Fleurus, 1690

Steenkirk, 1691

Landen, 1693

Upper Rhine

Staffarda, 1691

Toroella, 1694

Marsaglia, 1693

Kahlenberg, 1683
c. 140,000

Buda, 1686[34]85,000135,000


Ramillies, 1706

Oudenarde, 1708

Malplaquet, 1709

Friedlingen, 1702

Sieghard., 1703

Hšchstadt, 1703

Stollhofen, 1703


Hšchstadt, 1704

Chiara, 1701[35]

Luzzara, 1702

Calcinate, 1706

Turin, 1706

Zenta, 1697
Passage of
Lines, 1711

Denain, 1712

Upper Rhine
(Siege of) Landau, 1713

Milazzo, 1717

Francavilla, 1719

Banat, 1716

Kissoda, 1716

Belgrade, 1717

Now leaving Toronto.

[1]                                                                                                                                        Montecuccoli, Aforismi, 15.  Actually, this clich_ is much older than Montecuccoli. (2010): Excuses, excuses.
[2]                                                                                                                                        Imperial army strength see Dickson, Finance, 2:  Appendix A.
[3]                                                                                                                                        AFA (SUP) 1713:12/12 (Out of order and misdated, refer Carton 232) cites 106,000 troops of the Emperor, 24,000 of the Empire (Reichstag), 24,000 by the Circles, 13,000 by Brandenburg-Prussia, 10,000 by Hanover, and 8,000 by Munster.  Saxon, Hessian, Danish and Palatine forces were presumably enrolled directly in Dutch service.
[4]                                                                                                                                        John Lynn, “The Pattern of Army Growth, 1445-1945,” in Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871, ed. John Lynn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 20.
[5]                                                                                                                                        Adding direct taxation in Italy and Bavaria (c. 5 m fl. per year after 1706/7, or £4.2 m (Dickson, “War,” p. 307); revenues from the c. 400,000 subjects of the Imperial Knights (if taxed at the level of the Monarchy, they would have provided 400,000 fl. a year, or 8.8 m fl, £ 1.1m), of Habsburg lands subject to the treasury and war council in Innsbruck, probably a total in the same order; the Reich subsidy sometimes amounted to “several millions” a year (Vault, 12: 216) but apparently has not been researched in detail.  Assuming 2 m fl. a year, 1689-1713 less 1699-1700, £5.3 m; external borrowing, c. £1.5 m, and internal, about £ 6 m.
[6]                                                                                                                                        Jones, War, 28.
[7]                                                                                                                                        P.G.M. Dickson,  The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (London: Macmillan, New York: St. MartinÕs Press, 1967), 10.
[8]                                                                                                                                        Dickson, Financial, 47.
[9]                                                                                                                                        Dickson, Financial, 441.
[10]                                                                                                                                      See Jones, War, 274 and ff.
[11]                                                                                                                                      See John Hattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 133-141; and Jones, War, 308-17.
[12]                                                                                                                                      Financial crisis, see Dicskson, Financial, 75 and ff.; synthetic accounts, see Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660-1783 (London: S. Low, Marston, 1890), 217-18; and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (London: U. Hyman, 1988), 104-6.
[13]                                                                                                                                      Dickson, “War,” 298.
[14]                                                                                                                                      Kamen, War, 181-92.
[15]                                                                                                                                      Dickson, “War,” 302-3.
[16]                                                                                                                                      Churchill, Marlborough, 2: 500-02, 522-4, 534-43.
[17]                                                                                                                                      Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Ed. s.v. “Agriculture.”
[18]                                                                                                                                      Jones, War, 29-40.
[19]                                                                                                                                      Jones, War, 31.
[20]                                                                                                                                      Taafe, Letters, 8, Virginia Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 178-181, Feldzüge 1: 150-70; Feldzüge17, Supplemente: 61, “Prince Eugene to the Emperor, 18 June 1717.”
[21]                                                                                                                                      Gerhard Beneke, “The Westphalian Circle, the County of Lippe, and Imperial Currency Control,” in The Old Reich: Essays on German Public Institutions, eds. James Allen Vann and Steven W. Rowan (Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclop_dique, 1974), 146.
[22]                                                                                                                                      Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1: 462-8.
[23]                                                                                                                                      Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 8.
[24]                                                                                                                                      Pamela Smith, Business, 65-80.
[25]                                                                                                                                      Reich expenditures, see Christopher R. Friedrichs, Urban Society in an Age of War: Nördlingen 1580-1720 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 34; Thomas Wolf, Reichstädte in Kriegszeiten: Untersuchen zur Verfassungs-, Wirtschaft-, und Sozialgeschichte von Isny, Lindau, Memmingen, und Ravensburg im 17 Jahrhundert (Memmingen: Verlag Memminger Zeitung, 1991), 264.
[26]                                                                                                                                      Contributions and pioneers in general see for instance Myron P. Gutmann, War and Rural Life in the Early Modern Low Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 75-80.  Despite the title the discussion concerns the Liègois, not then politically or economically part of the Low Countries.
[27]                                                                                                                                      Lamberty, Mémoires, 8: 6-7; for a “commercial” interpretation of the Dutch state, see C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800 (New York: Knopf, 1965); agriculture receives more attention in Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 111-12, 332-7.
[28]                                                                                                                                      In “Remarks on Remarks: Or, the Barrier-Treaty and the Protestant Succession Vindicated,” in Wilson, Charles Henry, ed. Swiftiana: 1804 (London: R. Phillips, 1804; reprinted New York: Garland, 1974), 11; on finances and the Austrian Netherlands, see Israel, Dutch, 974-80.

[29]                                                                                                                                      Chandler, Art, 15.
[30]                                                                                                                                      KWM 8/191j.
[31]                                                                                                                                      Nevertheless, the main concern of contemporary English observers, whether they supported war or not, was the export of money.  See Francis Hare, ÒThe Allies and the Late Ministry Defended,Ó in Swiftiana: 1804 (New York: Garrison, 1974), 5-6.
[32]                                                                                                                                      Feldzüge 6: 795 shows cavalry regiments at winter quarters short ninety percent of their animals, while returns for cavalry regiments in service (i.e. AFA 1704 (Italien): 7/6) show horse strengths reduced by half.
[33]        In all cases for Danubian war the number cited is for the Imperial forces, because the very large totals cited for Turkish armies are simply not plausible, except in terms of a global mobilization figure including pioneers, garrisons and so on, forces that could not possibly have been present for the actual battles..

[34]        Duke Charles V, “Kriegstagebuch,” 310-5.
[35]        O. Redlich, Werden, 5.
[36]        Benjamin Brue, Journal de la campaigne que le Grand Vésir Ali Pasha a faite en 1715 pour la conquête de la Morée (Paris: E. Thorin, 1870)) specifically underlines that the cited total of 150,000 Turks in 1715 is a global figure, and not the number of fighting men drawn up in front of Athens..

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