"Failing forward" is the process by which a complex line of technical development is often driven forward by failure. As we have seen in our rush into the new information age, competitive advantage often goes to firms that are willing to push forward through failed iterations (Google Buzz/Wave) until they get to something that works. (Google+, we're thinking?)* Sorting out the complicated process by which the RAF ended up fighting the Second World War with Hurricanes and Spitfires, as opposed to, say, Gloster F.5/34 or Martin-Baker MB. 2 gives us a historical context.
And, speaking of moronic, I've been bottling this up since the last Canadian federal election, which saw a brave attempt by the Liberal Party to make the former Liberal government's decision to buy the F-23 as Canada's next generation jet fighter into an election issue. Say what you will about Michael Ignatieff, but he never missed a chance to miss a chance, which is why Canada now has a Conservative majority government that will bloody well buy the F-23 (Edit: F-35, obviously) contract, unless, as is likely, but not guaranteed, to be the case, it ends up significantly more expensive than expected.
The problem here, as air forces keep pointing out, is that shortened production runs leads to more expensive planes. If only the politicians would just order more planes, they'd be relatively cheaper. Making this argument would be easier, though, if the planes actually did what politicians need them to do. Since this appears to be spreading peace and friendship through sufficiently protracted bombing campaigns, one can see why the F-23 currently has the inside track.
*Look, he's trying to add relevance!
First of all, look at all the failing! Or flailing, your choice.
Interwar Fighter Prototypes and Production of the RAF/FAA
Manufacturer and type | #Prototypes | #Produced for services | #produced for export+license construction |
Fairey Pintail | 3 | 3 | |
Supermarine Seaking | 1 | ||
Fairey Pintail | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Gloster Nighthawk | ? | 3 | 3 |
Gloster Nightjar | ? | ||
F. Flycatcher* | 3 | 193 | |
Flycatcher II* | 1 | ||
Parnall Plover* | 6 | 7 | |
Blackburn 52 | 3 | ||
Short Springbok | 2 | ||
Gloster Grebe | 4 | 129 | |
Armstrong Whitworth Siskin | 4 | 770 (that’s what my notes say) | 12 |
Bristol 84 | 3 | 3 | |
Hawker Woodcock | 2 | 63 | 3 |
Handley Page P 21 | 1? | ||
G. Gamecock | 4 | 90 | 2+15 |
G. Gorcock | 3 | ||
Bristol 26 | 1 | ||
H. Hornbill | 1 | ||
H. Heron | 1 | ||
H. Hrngh?* | 1 | ||
H. Danecock | 1 | 3+12 | |
Vickers-Wibault R1 | 26 | ||
Westland Wizard | 1 | ||
A.S. ? | 1 | ||
G. Guan | 2 | ||
W. ? | 2 | ||
V. 123/141 | 2 | ||
Bristol Paul P31 | 2 | ||
H. F.9/26 | 1 | ||
Bristol Bagshot | 1 | ||
Bristol Bulldog | 1 | 346 | 30+2 |
Blackburn F1 | 1 | ||
Avro 584 | 2 | ||
G. Gambet | 1 | 150 | |
BP P33 | 1 | ||
G. Gnatsnapper | 2 | ||
Vickers V25 | 1 | ||
Bristol Bullpup | 1 | ||
Blackburn Lincock | 1 | ||
Various F.20/27 | 2 | ||
Various N.21/26 | 3 | ||
G. SS18 | 1 | ||
Saro A10 | 1 | ||
Fairey Firefly | 1 | 25+62 | |
H. Hornet/Fury | 1 | 230 | 45 |
Various O.22/26 | 3 | ||
H. Osprey | 1 | 133 | 7 |
Vickers 143 | 6 | ||
DeHavilland 77 | 1 | ||
Vickers 177 | 1 | ||
V. 1512 Jockey and other F.20/27 | 2 | ||
H. Nimrod | 1 | 87 | 4 |
Armstrong Whitworth XVI | 2 | 9 | |
Various F.29/27 | 2 | ||
H Demon | 1 | 239 | 64 |
G. Gauntlet | 128 | ?+17 | |
Westland Pterodactyl V | 1 | ||
Various F.7/30 | 6 | ||
G. Gladiator | 1 | 628 | less than 222 |
F. Fox VII | 2 | 2 | |
F Fantome | 1 | 1 | 2 |
AW35 Scimitar | 2 | 4 | |
H. Hurricane | 1 | 415 | 82 |
S. Spitfire | 1 | c. 200 |
Note that this is prewar production exclusively, and it is apparently not complete, since the promised F.5/34 prototypes are missing. Wikipedia to the rescue, with the additional information, omitted by previous generations of grognards, that the specification was specifically for an "overseas" fighter suitable to hot climates, and thus equipped with an air-cooled engine.
At one point it was argued, and somewhere still perhaps is still argued, that the choice of liquid-cooled over air-cooled engines was some kind of ghastly error (here), and that this is why American fighters were better, apart from being more modern in design. The general line of argument got Francis Mason upset, and he did up a nice table comparing two air-cooled fighters, the biplane Vickers Type 171 prototype, to the (supported) monoplane Boeing P-26 "Peashooter" XP-936 (P-26A prototype). The P-26, incidentally, was still on active duty in the Philippine Air Corps in December, 1941.
Plant | 530hp Jupiter VIIF | 500hp P&W R-1340-27 |
Span | 32 6" | 27 11" |
Length | 23 0" | 23 10" |
Height | 8 3" | 10 5" |
Wing area | 150 sq. ft | 149 sq. ft |
Tare weight | 2260lb | 2271lb |
All up weight | 3161lb | 3012lb |
Vmax | 218@10,000 | 234@7,500 |
Service ceiling | 29100 | 27400 |
First flight | 47759 | 20/03/32 |
Unfortunately, it's easy to get confused over just what, exactly, is the state of the art. A particularly egregious example of this is when pundits compare the aircraft held by the Fleet Air Arm at the beginning of the war to those of the United States Navy. It would be a nice comparison, if the FAA hadn't gone to war in 9/39, the USN in 12/41. That's a lot of water under the bridge, as this synoptic table extracted from Angelucci and Matricardi shows (p. 40.). The list isn't complete; I would throw in the Bf109D (1937) and Hawker Typhoon (1941) to give some additional data points, but the criteria of selection are subjective enough already.
1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 |
Gladiator, Hurricane, Polikarpov I-16 | Spitfire | Bf109E Fiat C.R. 42, Bf110, Macchi MC200, Nakajima Ki-27 | Beaufighter, Dewotine D.520, Grumman F4F, Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa, Mitsubishi A6M | FW190, Macchi MC202, P-39, P-40, MiG-3, LaGG-3 |
1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | |
P-38 Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu, Yakovlev-1 | Macchi MC205, Fiat G.55, Me410, He219, Kaw Ki-61, Nak Ki-84 and Ki–44, Grumman F6F, Vought F4U, P-51, Lavochkin La-5, Yak-9 | Tempest, Me-163, Me-262, P-61, La-7, Yak-3 | FW Ta-152 (FW190 follow on, not “Moskito”), Meteor, Kawasaki Ki-100 |
What emerges here is the extent to which the RAF's fighter development effort narrowed to only two planes, the Hurricane and Spitfire. It's easy, and traditional, to point to the wartime need for maximum combat aircraft production, but that is clearly not the issue here. Certainly the Russians and the Americans didn't get the memo!
And the same pattern shows up in the prewar era. Notwithstanding all the prototypes, the Siskin, Bulldog, Fury and Demon dominate interwar RAF procurement, the Flycatcher and Nimrod/Osprey that of the FAA. Lots of prototypes of many types ordered, to many specifications; a few types, winnowed out of various specifications, put into mass production.
At the same time, there are also the limited production contracts, which continued into the war. Production rationalisation was not carried to an extreme, and it is not obvious how it could have been. Consider this highly secret development project. A specialised high-altitude fighter ordered in 1940, the Welkin came into service in 1943. In 1940, it seemed as though the Germans would be moving towards a high-altitude bombing campaign. By 1943, it was clear that they weren't, but perhaps less certain that they would not soon resume high altitude reconnaissance flights. So, in the end, 77 completely useless Welkins were built. (Unless they were put to some James Bondish ultra-top-secret use as high altitude spy planes, although why that would this have been kept secret after the war? Maybe someone should make something up.) It is true that modified Spitfires did the work for which the Welkin was intended, but it is not obvious that this made production sense.
What does seem clear is that "failing forward" worked. More failures, if you will-- leads to fewer, hence more efficient, production runs. It may be that, on however narrowed a scale, we are seeing the same process work itself out with the F-35, which will turn out to be the Armstrong-Whitworth Siskin of the 21st Century. Produced in massive numbers at a gratifyingly low cost, it will do its dubious work, and be completely forgotten by posterity as a result of never having been used against a sufficiently glamorous enemy.
That's half the story, anyway. There's still engines to discuss.
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