After difficult years in the Thirties, the postwar era through the 1960s was a golden age for European steel. It is frequently noted in morbid stories about the decline of the British iron and steel industry that production peaked at 28.3 million tons in 1669, at which time Britain was the fifth largest producer in the world. Speaking to the Royal Institution on 26 May 1954, and reported in The Engineer on 11 June 1954 (197: 856--7) as T. P. Colclough, "Development in the Iron and Steel Industry in Great Britain," Colclough, who had a somewhat intangible career as corporate director, "technical advisor" to iron and steel companies, the Iron and Steel Federation, and the Ministry of Supply, and popular lecturer on metallurgical subjects, gives us a summary of recent developments.
but "[d]evelopment during the war years 1939--44 showed quite a different pattern. . ." by which, to be fair, Colclough intends a reference to 1914--18, BUT! It is fairly easy to look at the Thirties and agree on what should be done to put the industry back on its feet, but as for actually doing it? The Second War saw a decrease in British steel production rather than an increase, "but there was a marked change in the pattern of the quality of steel made," by which Colclough means electrical and alloy steels, the former rising from 230,000t in 1937--9 to a peak of 750,000t in 1943, while alloy steels hit a peak figure of 1.6 million tons. I reading this I am struck by an unmentioned anecdote, probably unknown to the author, shared by Dr. Bailey in his discussion of his namesake modular bridge set, of how it was crucial that the foundries that cast the pieces achieved a new standard of sizing control so that the holes would line up. I'm even more struck by Colclough's plaintive "This work placed Britain in a pre-eminent position in the manufacture of the highest qualities of steel, and it is to be hoped that the full story will be placed on record by the competent authorities." Because, no, Dr. Colclough, it will not. You're getting Paul Kennedy and Correlli Barnett instead.
Of course, it didn't hurt that planners were in charge, he goes on to say, and the need for "co-operation . . .discussion, and coordination" were demonstrated. The upshot, besides nationalisation, was the Five-Year Plan of 1946, to increase steel production over the prewar total by 3 million tons to 15 million by the installation of 5 million tons of new capacity and by the rationalisation and consolidation of manufacture. The 15 million ton target was met by 1949, but the rapidly growing economy showed it to be inadequate; a new target of 18 million tons, to be be met by the mid-Fifties, was established, with the author looking forward to 20.8 million tons by 1957, the primary obstacle being coal production, leading to some thumbsucking speculation about how the coal-gas industry might take the hit, and even absorb it if large gas grids made that industry more efficient --and we know where that went. (For those who don't natural gas from the offshore fields began landing in Britain 1967.) As it turns out, by the end of the decade steel was in abundance and all of that "cooperation, coordination, and discussion" fell away.
Can't imagine how that happened.
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